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ABSTRACT—Both discrimination by private employers and governmental
restrictions in the form of statutes that prohibit professional licensing serve
to exclude the formerly incarcerated from much of the labor market. This
Essay explores and analyzes potential legislative and contractual means for
removing these barriers to labor market participation by the formerly
incarcerated. First, as a means of addressing discrimination by the state, Part
I of this Essay explores the ways in which the adoption of racial impact
statements—which mandate that legislators consider statistical analyses of
the potential impact their proposed legislation may have on racial and ethnic
groups prior to enacting such legislation—could help to reduce labor market
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. In so doing, this Part
analyzes the influence of racial impact statements in the few states that have
implemented them. Part II of this Essay examines the possibility of a
contractual solution that could help to decrease discrimination against the
formerly incarcerated in the private labor market, particularly by those
employers who rely on the labor of imprisoned individuals. Specifically, this
Part uses the fact that many private corporations rely on and profit from lowwage prison labor to argue that the state penal institutions that lease prisoners
to such corporations should push for contractual agreements that stipulate
that corporations relying on prison labor must revoke policies that bar
employing the formerly incarcerated upon their release. In addition, this Part
explicates how contractual stipulations may also provide for affirmative
hiring policies for the formerly incarcerated. Finally, this Essay concludes
by highlighting how failure to address continued labor market discrimination
against the formerly incarcerated could render the formerly incarcerated a
permanent economic underclass, thereby undermining notions of fairness
and equality.
AUTHORS—Ifeoma Ajunwa, Assistant Professor, Cornell University
Industrial and Labor Relations School; Faculty Associate member, Cornell
Law School; and Faculty Associate, Berkman Klein Center at Harvard

1385

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

University. I am grateful to my research assistant, Kayleigh Yerdon, for her
outstanding research assistance.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of
California, Berkeley School of Law. Thanks to Dean Erwin Chemerinsky for
his research support. I also thank Mario Barnes and Deborah Tuerkheimer
for their helpful comments. Finally, I give special thanks to my husband,
Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, and our children, Elijah, Bethany, and Solomon, for
their constant love and support.
We give special thanks to the Northwestern University Law Review,
especially Ari Tolman, Adithi Grama, Hillary Chutter-Ames, and Ryan
Schmidt, for their exceptional work in editing this Essay.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1386
I. LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE FORMERLY INCARCERATED ..... 1394
A. Government Discrimination: Professional Licensing Laws .................... 1395
B. Private Employers: Reliance on Criminal Records in Hiring
and Firing ............................................................................................ 1397
C. The Importance of Addressing the Effects of Public and Private Labor
Market Discrimination Against the Formerly Incarcerated .................... 1398
II. GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: TURNING TO LEGISLATURES INSTEAD OF
LITIGATION .................................................................................................. 1401
III. A CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION TO PRIVATE EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST THE FORMERLY INCARCERATED ....................................................... 1406
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 1415

INTRODUCTION
Consider Shon Hopwood, a white man who robbed a bank at gunpoint
in August of 1997, escaped with $50,000, and managed to perform four more
robberies before the authorities eventually caught and arrested him.1
Following Hopwood’s capture, authorities brought him to justice for his
robberies, and he ultimately served eleven years in federal prison.2 While in
prison, Hopwood worked at the prison law library and wrote briefs to appeal
his case and the cases of other inmates; in fact, the third brief that Hopwood
ever wrote was accepted as part of a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, a

1
See Susan Svrluga, He Robbed Banks and Went to Prison. His Time There Put Him on Track for a
New
Job:
Georgetown
Law
Professor.,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
21,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/04/21/bank-robber-turned-georgetownlaw-professor-is-just-getting-started-on-his-goals [https://perma.cc/ACJ6-VFBG].
2
Id.
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truly remarkable feat of lawyering.3 At the age of thirty-three, Hopwood
walked out of prison a free man. Although Hopwood’s first post-prison job
was at a car wash, he was soon able to switch jobs and begin working at a
family-run legal printing business.4 Shortly thereafter, the New York Times
ran a profile on Hopwood, and Hopwood not only began to field speaking
invitations, but also negotiated a book deal.5 When Hopwood decided to
pursue a career as an attorney, he initially encountered some difficulty in
earning admission to law school, but with time, he received both admission
and a full scholarship from the University of Washington School of Law.6
After graduating from law school, Hopwood obtained a prestigious federal
clerkship as his first post-graduation job.7 Later, he received an employment
offer at a law firm with a salary of $400,000 a year, followed by employment
in a coveted tenure-track faculty position at Georgetown University Law
Center.8
Now compare Hopwood’s remarkable story9 and employment
outcomes with those of Reginald “Dwayne” Betts, a black man who was
convicted in 1996 for a carjacking he performed at the age of sixteen.10
Following his conviction, Betts, who was once facing a possible life
sentence, served eight years and three months in prison.11 After Betts was
released from prison, he earned a bachelor of arts degree from the University
of Maryland, a masters of fine arts (MFA) in writing from Warren Wilson
College, a Radcliffe Fellowship at Harvard University, and a law degree
from Yale Law School.12 Betts, a husband and father of two children, also
published two critically acclaimed books of poetry and a memoir entitled A

3
See Adam Liptak, A Mediocre Criminal, but an Unmatched Jailhouse Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8,
2010), https://nytimes.com/2010/02/09/us/09bar.html [https://perma.cc/JEH8-TAVY].
4
See Svrluga, supra note 1.
5
See
Author
Q&A:
Shon
Hopwood,
WASH.
INDEP.
(Sept.
20,
2012),
http://www.washingtonindependentreviewofbooks.com/features/author-qa-shon-hopwood
[https://perma.cc/J37X-CSG7] (discussing Shon Hopwood’s first book, Law Man).
6
See Svrluga, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
The focus on Professor Hopwood’s story is not to begrudge him his success; rather, it is to highlight
that formerly incarcerated people are capable of great success when they are truly given the opportunity
to reach their full potential. We find his story to be incredibly inspiring. He is due the highest praise, and
we believe his story is great evidence of why labor market discrimination against the formerly
incarcerated is so deeply problematic.
10
Elisa Gonzalez, A Decade After Prison, a Poet Studies for the Bar Exam, NEW YORKER (June 30,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/a-decade-after-prison-a-poet-studies-for-the-barexam [https://perma.cc/W6MC-4N5N].
11
Id.
12
Id.
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Question of Freedom.13 Yet in February of 2017, after Betts had passed the
Connecticut State Bar examination and accepted a position as a public
defender in New Haven, the Bar Examining Committee for Connecticut
denied him admission to the Connecticut Bar.14 In its letter, the Bar
Examining Committee explained its decision by stating that a “record
manifesting a significant deficiency in the honesty, trustworthiness,
diligence or reliability of an applicant may constitute a basis for denial of
admission.”15 In the end, Betts was able to receive certification of good moral
character from the Committee and earn admission to the Connecticut Bar,
but only after nationwide protest and numerous newspaper articles critiquing
the Committee’s initial decision to deny Betts admission.16 Professor James
Forman of Yale Law School noted that it was sad that Betts, more than
twenty years after he committed a carjacking as a teenager and after two
decades of compiling an incredibly impressive academic and professional
record, was still being told: “We are always going to judge you differently.”17
In fact, Betts’s story reveals not only how he, a former felon, may forever be
treated differently because of this status, but also how black former prisoners
frequently receive different treatment than white former prisoners upon their
release, even when they share similar credentials.18 Unlike Hopwood, who
was given numerous prestigious opportunities after law school, Betts instead
was initially cut off at the pass when the Connecticut Bar first denied him
admission into the profession. Although the outcome for Betts ultimately
turned out to be positive, the difficulties he faced in simply gaining
admission to the Bar illustrate how the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions may be enacted in racially disparate ways.
As the Betts example shows, the formerly incarcerated, particularly
those of color, are quite vulnerable to rampant labor market discrimination

13

Id.
See Bari Weiss, Admit This Ex-Con to the Connecticut Bar, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/opinion/admit-this-ex-con-to-the-connecticut-bar.html
[https://perma.cc/2GSN-MVK7].
15
Id.
16
See Vinny Vella, State Bar Committee Approves Jail-to-Yale Lawyer, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept.
29, 2017), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-news-dwayne-betts-approved-20170929story.html [https://perma.cc/4T3E-VB8D] (noting that Betts’s case “drew national attention, including an
editorial from The New York Times calling on the bar association to approve him”). Betts is now a student
in the Ph.D. program at Yale Law School. YALE LAW SCH., Studying Law at Yale: Dwayne Betts,
https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/degree-programs/graduate-programs/phd-program/phdcandidate-profiles/dwayne-betts [https://perma.cc/R7AF-3VMB].
17
Weiss, supra note 14.
18
See infra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
14
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after their release from prison.19 Indeed, a 2015 survey of formerly
incarcerated individuals revealed that 76% of the respondents rated their
experience in finding employment as very difficult or nearly impossible due
to their past criminal convictions.20
This discrimination that the formerly incarcerated face in the labor
market is extensive, occurring both as a result of governmental and private
action. For instance, in many states and municipalities, the formerly
incarcerated encounter significant difficulty in obtaining employment in
licensed professions because government statutes either directly or indirectly
prevent them from obtaining work licenses in a variety of fields, such as
nursing, barbering, and education.21 The formerly incarcerated also face
19
See generally Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination
Against Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 46–47 (2015); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment
Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (noting that courts and legislatures discourage employers
from hiring workers with criminal records and encourage employers to discipline workers for non-workrelated criminal misconduct, effectively rendering private employers a de facto branch of the criminal
justice system); Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime
Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3 (2013); Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the
Intersection of Prisoner Reentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261,
269–70 (2006) (explaining how tort laws and pressure from private insurers discourage employers from
hiring the formerly incarcerated); see also Stephenson v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 3d 566, 569
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting how employers are discouraged from hiring the formerly incarcerated because
of “potential negligent hiring liability,” “strong societal stigma,” and even insurance companies that
refuse “to cover employees who are former felons”); JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL
RECORD 275–300 (2015) (detailing how a criminal record can prevent the formerly incarcerated from
finding employment).
20
ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Families
(2015), http://ellabakercenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/who-pays.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6W4VDXC].
21
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101(1)(a) (West 2018) (forbidding persons convicted of
a felony or other crimes involving moral turpitude from serving as peace officers, educators, positions
involving direct contact with vulnerable persons, positions in public or private correctional facilities or
juvenile facilities, various state offices, plus more); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-9-49(2) (2018)
(allowing the state licensing board to deny a nursing license to any person “convicted of a felony”); see
also Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 597 (2006) (noting that
the formerly incarcerated “are routinely excluded from many employment opportunities that
require professional licenses”). These statutes prevent the formerly incarcerated from receiving
professional licenses either directly through explicit exclusion or indirectly through “moral character”
clauses. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6905 (McKinney 2018) (noting that an applicant shall “be of good
moral character as determined by the department” in order “[t]o qualify for a license as a registered
professional nurse”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 64.3 (2018) (“A limited permit to practice
as a registered professional nurse or licensed practical nurse may be issued after the applicant has met
requirements of age, moral character, education and proficiency examination . . . .”); see also Bruce E.
May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the ExFelon’s Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 193 (1995) (“In some states virtually the only
‘profession’ open to an ex-felon is that of burglar; the ex-felon is barred from other activities because she
or he is presumed to be a person of bad moral character, regardless of the nature of the crime or its
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serious discrimination within the private employment market, as many
employers use the results from applicants’ criminal background checks to
deny them employment.22 Furthermore, even after some formerly
incarcerated people are able to find employment and are performing their
jobs well, employers may still terminate those individuals once the employer
discovers their criminal history.23
Not surprisingly, studies show that even after five years of release from
prison, almost 67% of all formerly incarcerated individuals remain
unemployed or underemployed.24 Other studies have shown that labor market
discrimination is particularly pernicious for ex-offenders who are racial
minorities, especially if they are black.25 For example, the research of
sociologists Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Naomi Sugie reveals not only
that black job applicants with criminal records are less likely to obtain a job
callback interview than white job applicants with criminal records, but also
that black job applicants without a criminal record are less likely to receive
a callback interview than white job applicants with a criminal record.26

relevance to the intended occupation.”). A number of real-life cases illustrate the hazards of state and
municipal statutes that place barriers on the formerly incarcerated individual’s ability to obtain
professional licenses. See, e.g., Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 453 (1954) (holding that a
doctor’s state license to practice medicine could be suspended on the basis of a conviction without
violating his due process rights because the state statute was “well within the degree of reasonableness
required to constitute due process of law in a field so permeated with public responsibility as that of
health”); Standow v. City of Spokane, 564 P.2d 1145, 1152–53 (Wash. 1977) (finding that the denial of
a formerly incarcerated applicant’s request for a license to operate a vehicle for hire based on a city
ordinance that permitted the denial of such license on the basis of his prior convictions was valid on the
grounds that the applicant’s previous driving infractions and felony convictions were reasonably related
to his ability to drive a motor vehicle for hire), overruled by State v. Smith, 610 P.2d 869 (Wash. 1980).
22
See Sandra J. Mullings, Employment of Ex-Offenders: The Time Has Come for a True
Antidiscrimination Statute, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 261, 272 (2014) (pointing out survey results where
73% and 88% of employers indicated that they conducted criminal background checks for all applicants);
Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking “Rational Discrimination” Against Ex-Offenders, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 283, 284 (2006) (highlighting a “survey of employers in four major metropolitan areas” where
“only 12.5% of employers said that they would definitely accept an application from an individual with
a criminal record, and 25.9% said that they probably would”).
23
See, e.g., Cisco v. UPS, 476 A.2d 1340, 1343–44 (1984) (holding that criminal charges against an
employee—even though the charges ultimately resulted in an acquittal—were sufficient grounds for
termination and did not violate any public policy because the employer had a right to protect its reputation
by discharging the individual).
24
ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20.
25
See, e.g., Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Naomi Sugie, Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to
Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 195, 195 (2009); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 960
(2003); Jordan Segall, Mass Incarceration, Ex-Felon Discrimination & Black Labor Market
Disadvantage, 14 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 159, 160 (2011).
26
Pager, Western & Sugie, supra note 25, at 199–209; Pager, supra note 25, at 958.
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The prospects for eliminating or even significantly reducing labor
market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated are dim, both in the
public and private realms. In the public realm, equal protection claims are
unlikely to abrogate government statutes that prohibit the formerly
incarcerated from obtaining the professional licenses required for certain
jobs because any challenges to the use of a prisoner–nonprisoner
classification in the statutes are likely to survive the low hurdle of rational
basis review.27 Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey
forecloses any avenue for addressing this labor market discrimination against
formerly incarcerated individuals who are racial minorities.28 In McCleskey,
the Court held that Georgia’s application of the death penalty did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause, despite its disparate effects based on the race of
the defendant and the race of the victim.29 Additionally, the Court held that
proof of intent to discriminate is necessary if plaintiffs wish to prevail on
race-based equal protection claims, which means that any formerly
incarcerated plaintiffs who wish to prove that professional license-restricting
statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause must prove unlawful intent by
the respective legislatures in passing such statutes.30 McCleskey, however,
makes it clear that such formerly incarcerated plaintiffs would not be able to
prove unlawful race discrimination in these cases because they could not
show that the involved legislatures passed such statutes “in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ [their] adverse effects upon” Blacks.31 Furthermore,

27

See infra Part II.
Id.
29
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297–99 (1987).
30
See id.
31
See id. at 298. Throughout this Essay, we capitalize the words “Black” and “White” when we use
them as nouns to describe a racialized group; however, we do not capitalize these terms when we use
them as adjectives. Additionally, we find that “[i]t is more convenient to invoke the terminological
differentiation between black and white than say, between African-American and Northern EuropeanAmerican, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4. Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw, one of the founders of Critical Race
Theory, has explained that “Black” deserves capitalization because “Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos, . . .
constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). Also, we generally prefer to use the term “Blacks” to
the term “African Americans” because “Blacks” is more inclusive. For example, while the term “Blacks”
encompasses black permanent residents or other black noncitizens in the United States, the term “African
Americans” includes only those who are formally Americans, whether by birth or naturalization. That
said, given the historical nature of several parts of this Essay, and in light of the fact that a large influx of
black immigrants did not occur in the United States until the 1960s and 1970s, we sometimes use the term
“African American” where the term “Black” is not needed for inclusivity reasons. See Kevin R. Johnson,
The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49
28
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equal protection jurisprudence in general makes it clear that formerly
incarcerated plaintiffs cannot establish that these license-restricting statutes
are grounded in a racial classification.32 Even though African-Americans and
Latinos are overrepresented in prisons in the United States33—and thus
disproportionately affected by such state statutes—they would not be able to
show that the felon or ex-offender “classification” in these statutes
constitutes a racial classification.34 Indeed, courts would be certain to
highlight that Whites are actually the numerical majority in the nation’s
prisons, even though they are underrepresented in comparison to their
representation in the national population.35
In the private realm, the formerly incarcerated would face equally
formidable obstacles in proving unlawful discrimination. After all, there is
no federal statute that prohibits employers from discriminating against the
formerly incarcerated in hiring or promotion.36 Although the “Ban the Box”
movement is growing in the country, and a number of states have actually
banned the boxes that ask about criminal history on applications, such
actions reduce only the possibility that an employer will discriminate against
the formerly incarcerated based on their former prisoner status; they do not
make it unlawful for employers to actually discriminate against the formerly
incarcerated on the basis of former prisoner status.37 The only hope that
formerly incarcerated plaintiffs have for combating discrimination in the
private labor market comes from a nonbinding policy statement by the Equal
UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1484 (2002) (“The year 1965 thus marked the beginning of a much more diverse,
far less European immigrant stream into this country.”).
32
Cf. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1303 (1995)
(“The Court has defined ‘discriminatory purpose’ to mean, in race cases, out-and-out racial animus—an
affirmative desire to hurt blacks.”).
33
See GLENN C. LOURY, RACE, INCARCERATION AND AMERICAN VALUES 6 (2008) (comparing the
United States’ incarceration rate to that of other nations and detailing that the U.S. prison population is
“vastly disproportionately black and brown”).
34
Cf. Sklansky, supra note 32, at 1304 (explaining that the race-based equal protection challenges
to the crack–powder cocaine and essentially black–white disparity in sentencing repeatedly failed because
“it is difficult if not impossible to prove, in part because hardly anyone admits to racism anymore, and in
part because crack posed real dangers as well as symbolic ones, and much of what motivated Congress
in 1986 appears to have been a well-founded fear of the drug’s actual effects, on blacks as well as on
whites”).
35
See Statistics: Inmate Race, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Feb. 24, 2018),
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp
[https://perma.cc/Y4B4-HVLQ]
(indicating that Whites constitute 58.4% of all prisoners); Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1,
2016), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/KPH5-WH44]
(indicating that Whites constitute 76.9% of the United States population).
36
See Mullings, supra note 22, at 272.
37
EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment
Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, EEOC (Apr. 25, 2012),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/74J9-5EVV].
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which advises that an
employer’s use of criminal background checks can violate the law if it is
used to intentionally discriminate against minorities or has a demonstrably
adverse discriminatory impact on minorities in employment.38 In summary,
litigation alone is unlikely to eliminate or even reduce labor market
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated, including its disparate
racial effects.
Keeping in mind that litigation is inadequate39 for fully addressing the
problem of labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated,
this Essay explores and analyzes potential legislative and contractual means
for removing the expansive barriers to labor market participation by exoffenders. First, as a means of addressing government-based discrimination,
this Essay explores the potential effect that requiring racial impact
statements—which mandate that legislators consider statistical analyses of
the potential impact that legislation may have on racial and ethnic groups
prior to passing any legislation—could have on employment discrimination
against the formerly incarcerated. The Essay then moves on to consider a
contractual solution that partially addresses discrimination by private firms,
particularly those that rely on the labor of imprisoned individuals.
Part I of this Essay describes two different forms of labor market
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated: (1) government-based
discrimination in the form of laws that prohibit issuing professional licenses
to the formerly incarcerated and (2) private discrimination in the form of
corporate employers who use criminal records to deny or terminate
employment. It also explores the negative effects on individuals and
communities that arise from labor market discrimination against the formerly
incarcerated. Part II examines one potential solution to government-based
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated in work law: requiring all
legislative bodies to produce, examine, and consider racial impact statements
before enacting any legislation that will affect the formerly incarcerated. In
so doing, Part II analyzes the influence of racial impact statements in the few
states that have implemented them. Part III then discusses contractual
stipulation as another innovative solution for addressing discrimination by
private corporations against the formerly incarcerated. Part III begins by
examining the phenomenon of prison labor to demonstrate the
appropriateness of this Essay’s proposed contractual solution. Recognizing
that many individuals actually provide low-wage (in fact, nearly free) labor
38

Id.
Reva Siegel makes this a central point in her Essay. See Reva Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court
Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—And Some
Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269 (2018).
39
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for private corporations while they are in prison, this Part argues that the state
penal institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations should push for
contractual agreements that stipulate that corporations relying on prison
labor must revoke any and all policies that bar employing the formerly
incarcerated upon their release. In addition, Part III explicates how
contractual stipulations may also provide for affirmative hiring policies for
the formerly incarcerated. Finally, this Essay concludes by highlighting how
failing to address continued labor market discrimination against the formerly
incarcerated could render the formerly incarcerated a permanent economic
underclass and undermine the most fundamental democratic notions of
fairness and equality.
I.

LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE
FORMERLY INCARCERATED

The formerly incarcerated encounter numerous collateral consequences
from their convictions, including loss of voting rights, restricted access to
housing, and limited employment opportunities.40 A collateral legal
consequence of criminal conviction is defined as a legal “penalty, disability,
or disadvantage, however denominated, imposed on an individual as a result
of the individual’s conviction of an offense [that] applies by operation of law
whether or not the penalty, disability, or disadvantage is included in the
judgment or sentence.”41 The collateral legal consequences of criminal
convictions have also been referred to as “punishment that is accomplished
through the diminution of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal

40

See Steven D. Bell, The Long Shadow: Decreasing Barriers to Employment, Housing, and Civic
Participation for People with Criminal Records Will Improve Public Safety and Strengthen the Economy,
42 W. ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014).
41
See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 2(1), 5 (2010),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GSJ7-KHJC]. In July of 2009, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) approved for the first time model legislation—the Uniform Collateral
Consequences of Conviction Act (UCCCA)—designed to facilitate offender reentry throughout the
United States. A revised Act was approved in July 2010 and published on January 6, 2011. Although such
models of uniform legislation do not carry the force of law because the NCCUSL is an advisory
organization only, they still hold meaningful authority. After all, uniform acts approved by the NCCUSL
have been, and continue to be, a factor in shaping the development of law across the United States. The
newly approved UCCCA has been enacted in North Carolina and has been introduced in Connecticut,
Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, and Vermont. See, e.g., S.B. 1063, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Conn. 2013); S.B. 292, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2017); see also UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Collateral
Consequences
of
Conviction
Act
(2010),
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Collateral%20Consequences%20of%20Conviction%20Act
[https:perma.cc/54U2-Y7LH].
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residency in the United States.”42 Although the problems associated with the
collateral consequences of conviction43 are legion and touch upon every
aspect of life, this Part focuses solely on the collateral consequences of
conviction on employment, including exclusion from the labor market as a
result of intersectional discrimination on the basis of race and criminal
status.44 Specifically, this Part details the forms of discrimination faced by
the formerly incarcerated in the public and private labor market, as well as
the consequences of such discrimination for the formerly incarcerated, their
families, and society in general. Section I.A. begins by describing statesanctioned discrimination against the formerly incarcerated through
restrictions or prohibitions in issuing professional licenses to former
prisoners. Section I.B then details how private corporations discriminate
against the formerly incarcerated. Finally, Section I.C explains why
combating labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is
critical by detailing the harms of such discrimination, not only for formerly
incarcerated individuals, but also for their families and greater society.
A. Government Discrimination: Professional Licensing Laws
As scholars like Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Becky Pettit have
long asserted, incarceration—or more accurately, the general stigma that
attaches to incarceration—results in poor employment outcomes.45 Indeed,
Western and Pettit’s analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth revealed that “serving time in prison was associated with a 40
42
See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15–16 (Marc Mauer &
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
43
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race
and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 461 (2010). As one legal scholar has noted, “the problem of
postconviction collateral consequences is rapidly becoming more severe for three interrelated reasons.
First, collateral consequences have increased in number, scope, and severity since the 1980s. Second,
record numbers of individuals are now exiting U.S. correctional facilities. Finally, collateral
consequences hinder reentry and exacerbate the risks of recidivism; in fact, most individuals will be
rearrested within three years of release.” Id.
44
See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 13
(2010).
45
See id. at 13–14 (detailing how incarceration limits work and economic opportunities). Cf.
Catherine London, Racial Impact Statements: A Proactive Approach to Addressing Racial Disparities in
Prison Populations, 29 LAW & INEQ. 211, 222–23 (2011) (noting how the “stigma of a felony conviction
follows prisoners long after release and imposes an enormous burden on minority populations”). See
generally Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 617
(discussing the legal implications of the author’s audit study of employment prospects for formerly
incarcerated men); Pager, supra note 25 (conducting an audit study by using male job applicants with
criminal records and a control group and finding that those with criminal records were least likely to get
callbacks and, further, that this effect was shaped by the race of the applicant, with black males with
criminal records being the least likely to get a callback).
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percent reduction in earnings and with reduced job tenure, reduced hourly
wages, and higher unemployment.”46
One of the reasons why the formerly incarcerated suffer reduced
employment opportunities in the labor market is legislation—at both the state
and local government level—that either outright prohibits issuing them
professional licenses or provides the grounds for licensing boards to unfairly
rely on stereotypes and biases against ex-offenders to deny the formerly
incarcerated professional licenses. Even in the 1970s, before the
phenomenon of mass incarceration emerged, there were “1,948 separate
statutory provisions that affect[ed] the licensing of persons with an arrest or
conviction record.”47
Although a substantial number of states now have laws that prohibit
licensing boards from denying the formerly incarcerated professional
licenses based on past convictions that bear no relation to the work at issue,48
many other states have maintained statutes that enable licensing boards to
exclude the formerly incarcerated from work in certain fields simply because
of a past felony conviction, even if that past conviction does not relate to the
work at issue.49 For instance, in South Dakota, nursing licensing boards may
deny a license to any person with a felony conviction.50 Indeed, as one
scholar noted, “laws regulating public-employment hiring or licensing” bar
ex-felons from obtaining licenses in at least 800 “discrete occupations.”51
More so, courts have consistently upheld the application of such
license-restricting statutes to former prisoners.52 For example, in Heller v.
Ross, a federal district court upheld a licensing board’s decision to deny the
plaintiff an insurance provider license based on a provision excluding all
persons with felony convictions from obtaining such a license.53 In so doing,
the court reasoned that the challenged provision survived constitutional
46
47
48

Western & Pettit, supra note 44, at 13.
May, supra note 21, at 193.
See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15) (McKinney 2018); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney

2018).
49

May, supra note 21, at 193.
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-9-49(2) (2018).
51
Segall, supra note 25, at 172.
52
See, e.g., Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (holding that a doctor’s state license to
practice medicine could be suspended on the basis of a conviction); Heller v. Ross, 682 F. Supp. 2d 797
(E.D. Mich. 2010); Acosta v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 946 N.E.2d 731, 732–33 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that
there are two significant exceptions to the state’s prohibition that employers may not deny licenses “by
reason of [an] individual’s having been previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses”;
specifically, the exceptions might apply if (1) “there is a direct relationship between one or more of the
previous criminal offenses and the specific license” or if (2) granting the license “would involve an
unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public”).
53
682 F. Supp. 2d at 807.
50
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scrutiny because “it applies only to would-be resident producers within the
insurance industry; that is, it ‘only restricts felons from receiving one type of
license,’” rather than restricting them from all licenses.54
In addition to blanket statutory exclusions from certain jobs, “moral
character” provisions also provide a means for denying the formerly
incarcerated certain professional licenses and excluding them from
employment in those fields.55 For instance, in Wombles v. City of Mount
Washington, a federal district court upheld the denial of a business license to
the plaintiff, noting that the challenged town ordinance “only restrict[ed] the
granting of licenses based on . . . crimes of moral turpitude,” even though the
ordinance left the term “moral turpitude” undefined.56
B. Private Employers: Reliance on Criminal Records in Hiring and Firing
In addition to labor market discrimination through license-restricting
statutes, research shows that private employers often use criminal records as
a reason for denying the formerly incarcerated employment or for
terminating them thereafter.57 Indeed, one audit study by Devah Pager
revealed that having a criminal record alone drastically reduced the chance
of receiving a callback from an employer.58 Specifically, the study showed
that, regardless of the race of the offenders, criminal records decreased a
formerly incarcerated applicant’s likelihood of getting a callback by at least
50%.59
Pager’s research further revealed that private labor market
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is much more severe for
Blacks than it is for Whites.60 For instance, Pager found that “even whites
with criminal records received more favorable treatment (17%) than blacks
without criminal records (14%)” when both groups were considered for
callback interviews.61 While the ratio of callbacks for white job applicants
without criminal records to white job applicants with criminal records was
two-to-one—with 34% of whites without a criminal record obtaining
callback interviews, compared with 17% of those with criminal records—the

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 805 (quoting Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1043 (6th Cir. 1984)).
May, supra note 21, at 193.
No. 3:15-CV-00856-TBR, 2017 WL 927238, at *6–7 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 8, 2017).
See, e.g., Pager, supra note 25 at 956–59.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 957–59.
Id.
Id. at 958.
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comparable ratio for black job applicants was three-to-one, making the effect
of a criminal record for Blacks 40% larger than it was for Whites.62
Additionally, it is important to note that the detrimental impact of a
criminal record attaches even when a defendant has been acquitted of
charges. In fact, Cisco v. UPS illustrates this reality. In Cisco, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania held that, absent any applicable statute, criminal
charges against an employee were sufficient grounds for termination (and a
refusal to rehire), even when the employee had ultimately been acquitted of
the charges.63 The court reasoned that the employer had not violated any
public policy because the “employer was protecting its reputation by
discharging” the individual.64 The court explained:
Thus, marriages crumble when one is adjudged guilty without ever being
considered innocent and jobs are lost when the employer, for a legitimate
business reason, cannot risk even someone under suspicion of having
committed theft and trespass when the nature of its business is to enter onto the
premises of others and to deliver parcels which belong to them.65

In essence, even as the court recognized the illogic and injustice of these
discriminatory practices by a private employer, plus their substantial impact
on individuals, families, and communities, it still chose to affirm an
employer’s right to engage in these damaging actions.
C. The Importance of Addressing the Effects of Public and Private Labor
Market Discrimination Against the Formerly Incarcerated
Developing new approaches for addressing labor market discrimination
against the formerly incarcerated is crucial because the consequences of this
pervasive discrimination are severe, not only for formerly incarcerated
individuals, but also for society more broadly. Recent studies examined the
unemployment rate for formerly incarcerated adults and found that, of those
interviewed one to three months after release, only 10% were employed fulltime, and only 44% of those interviewed eight months after release said they
had worked at least one week since their release.66 Although 60% of all exprisoners are rearrested within three years, ex-prisoners who have stable
employment are much less likely to recidivate and more likely to reintegrate
62

Id.
476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (1984).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
SHAWN BUSHWAY ET AL., BARRIERS TO REENTRY? THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED
PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 89 (2007) (examining the labor market for released prisoners
in the post-industrial United States through employer surveys, interviews with former prisoners, and state
data on prison employment programs and post-incarceration outcomes).
63
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into society than those without steady employment or with no employment
at all.67 After all, steady jobs make it more likely that an ex-prisoner will be
able to financially support himself or his family.68
Additionally, labor market discrimination against the formerly
incarcerated negatively contributes to the national unemployment rate.69 As
Cherrie Bucknor and Alan Barber highlighted in a 2016 Center for Economic
and Policy Research paper, formerly incarcerated men contribute 1.6 to 1.8
percentage points to the national male unemployment rate.70 Additionally,
overall employment rates are .09 to 1 percentage points lower as a result of
the discrimination faced by the large population of former prisoners and
people with felony convictions; this reduction in employment equals a
reduction of nearly two million workers.71 If one includes the currently
incarcerated in these estimates, the impact is even greater, particularly for
uneducated men of color.72 For example, in 2008, data showed that
approximately 60% of black men without a high school education were
unemployed; however, when black male high school dropouts who were
incarcerated were included, the percentage of unemployed men in that group
increased to approximately 75%.73 In other words, as Western and Pettit
proclaimed, “by 2008 these men were more likely to be locked up than
employed.”74
Furthermore, as Western and Pettit highlighted in their National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth analysis, the inequities that stem from
incarceration are intergenerational. They not only negatively affect the
incarcerated and the formerly incarcerated, they also harm their families,
67
See Pinard, supra note 43; see also Jennifer Lundquist, Devah Pager & Eiko Strader, Does a
Criminal Past Predict Worker Performance? Evidence from One of America’s Largest Employers,
96 SOC. FORCES 1039, 1039 (2018).
68
DIANA BRAZZELL ET AL., FROM THE CLASSROOM TO THE COMMUNITY: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF
EDUCATION
DURING
INCARCERATION
AND
REENTRY
17
(July
31,
2009),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411963_classroom_community.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33K9TN79]; see also BUSHWAY ET AL., supra note 66.
69
Note that the national unemployment rate shows the percentage of the labor force that is without
a job. It defines unemployed people as those who are willing and able to work, and who have actively
sought work within the past four weeks. As the rate increases, it is understood that more Americans are
having trouble finding stable employment. See Unemployment Rate, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unemploymentrate.asp [https://perma.cc/C86X-2VAC].
70
CHERRIE BUCKNOR & ALAN BARBER, THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC COSTS OF BARRIERS TO
EMPLOYMENT FOR FORMER PRISONERS AND PEOPLE CONVICTED OF FELONIES 1 (2016),
http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/employment-prisoners-felonies-2016-06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4PZ-QKXD].
71
Id.
72
Western & Pettit, supra note 44, at 12.
73
Id. at 12–13.
74
Id. at 12.
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including their partners, children, grandchildren, and other descendants.75
Finally, labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated harms
society’s sense of fairness. No studies support the idea that formerly
incarcerated individuals are poor workers or pose a greater security risk than
workers who have not been convicted of a crime. Instead, as the work of
sociologist Devah Pager shows, the formerly incarcerated pose no higher
level of risk than their coworkers without criminal records.76 In a compelling
case study, Jennifer Lundquist, Devah Pager, and Eiko Strader focused on
the largest employer in the United States: the U.S. military. In the absence
of a mandatory draft, the military relies on recruiting individuals (including
those with felonies) to serve.77 The authors found that, even in the military,
which mandates even stricter rules for conduct than civilian workplaces,
workers with felony-level criminal records are no more likely to be
discharged for the negative reasons employers assume (such as misconduct
or poor work performance) than those with no criminal record.78
Furthermore, they found that there was no evidence that individuals with
serious criminal records showed elevated levels of early termination—a key
finding, since data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that “the risk
of recidivism falls steadily with time since arrest, with nearly 60 percent of
recidivism occurring within the first year.”79 All in all, Lundquist et al.’s
research seems to indicate that there is no greater risk in employing the
formerly incarcerated than the never incarcerated, and that the risk is
particularly lower for formerly incarcerated individuals who have been out
of prison for some time.80
In all, reducing and ultimately eliminating labor market discrimination
against the formerly incarcerated is crucial because unemployment makes
successful reentry much more difficult for them. Studies have repeatedly
demonstrated that employment serves to reduce recidivism among the

75

Id. at 8; see also London, supra note 45, at 222–23 (“High incarceration rates in some areas,
particularly low-income African American neighborhoods, have considerable consequences for families
and communities. High recidivism rates further disrupt families, resulting in a dangerous pattern of
imprisonment. Harsh sentencing policies and lack of reentry support ‘harm children and contribute to the
intergenerational transmission of offending.’ Children face a host of challenges stemming from parental
imprisonment.” (footnotes omitted)).
76
Lundquist, Pager & Strader, supra note 67, at 1050.
77
Id. at 1040.
78
Id. at 1050.
79
Id. at 1041.
80
We understand that some might argue that the U.S. military, with its strict routines, protocols, and
supervision, is too specialized an employer to be generalizable as a case study, and in that vein we urge
private employers to allow the study of their formerly incarcerated employees for the benefit of societal
edification.
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formerly incarcerated.81 Addressing discrimination must also include
addressing wages because levels of compensation also influence reentry
outcomes, as those making higher wages are less likely to recidivate.82
The next two Parts of this Essay offer a couple of suggestions for
combating both public and private market discrimination against the
formerly incarcerated. Part II of this Essay proposes a means by which
legislatures can help to reduce state-sanctioned discrimination against the
formerly incarcerated in the workplace, and Part III turns to a potential
contractual remedy for some of the discrimination that the formerly
incarcerated face in the private labor market.
II. GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: TURNING TO LEGISLATURES
INSTEAD OF LITIGATION
As noted earlier, litigation, particularly equal protection litigation, is
unlikely to be an effective means for combating state-sanctioned labor
market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated through licenserestricting statutes for a variety of reasons. Those reasons include the low
level of scrutiny—rational basis review—that would be applied to claims
concerning a prisoner/non-prisoner classification and McCleskey’s
requirement that plaintiffs in race-based equal protection lawsuits prove a
legislature’s intent to pass the challenged statute “‘because of,’ not merely
‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” a racial group.83 In light of the limited
impact that litigation is likely to have on reducing state-sanctioned
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated in the workplace, this Part
proposes a means by which state legislatures can help to lessen the impact of
this discrimination—in this instance, the discrimination that occurs through
state statutes that prohibit licensing entities from granting certain
professional licenses to the formerly incarcerated. Specifically, this Part of
the Essay proposes that all legislative bodies should adopt a requirement for
81
See MILES HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EVALUATION,
RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987, at 4–5
(1994),
https://www.bop.gov/resources/research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A55D-FVH8]; Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, A Life-Course Theory of Cumulative
Disadvantage and the Stability of Delinquency, in ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 21 (Terence
P.
Thornberry
ed.,
1997),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/sampson/files/1997_act_laub.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JEU3-CZGC]; Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of
Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 529 (2000),
http://users.soc.umn.edu/~uggen/Uggen_asr_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/37CF-LZNE].
82
Christy Visher et al., Employment After Prison: A Longitudinal Study of Releasees in Three States,
URBAN
INST.
JUST.
POL’Y
CTR.
(Oct.
1,
2008),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32106/411778-Employment-after-Prison-ALongitudinal-Study-of-Releasees-in-Three-States.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9PG-GGPB].
83
See supra notes 29–39 and accompanying text.
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“racial impact statements,” which force legislators to engage in a statistical
analysis about the disproportionate impact that any proposed legislation may
have on racial and ethnic minorities before they pass the proposed
legislation.84
The call for racial impact statements arose from a recognition of the
devastating impact that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which provided
mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes, and other “War on Drugs”
policies were having on communities of color, especially the black
community.85 That recognition involved not only an acknowledgment of
mass incarceration as a pernicious social problem in the United States,86 but
also an understanding of mass incarceration as a social issue that has
uniquely plagued black and brown communities.87
84
See generally London, supra note 45, at 212 (defining “racial impact statement [as] a predictive
report summarizing the effects that legislation may have on minority groups”).
85
See id. at 211 (discussing how the Act’s proposed sentences for crack-cocaine crimes had a
damaging effect on black communities); see also DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES
RACE MATTER? THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (1993) (explaining that sentencing
during the “War on Drugs” was disproportionately slanted toward longer sentences for Blacks than
Whites, even for similar crimes); Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and
Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 20 (2008) (arguing that
disproportionate minority confinement results from several factors, including sentencing policies that
have a disparate impact on racial minorities).
86
See Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law
of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 307 (2009) (“United States imprisonment rates are
now almost five times higher than the historical norm prevailing throughout most of the twentieth century,
and they are three to five times higher than in other Western democracies.”); see also Adam Liptak,
Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1 (“The United States has
less than 5 percent of the world’s population. But it has almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners.”).
Recent studies show that nearly one in three Americans have been arrested by the time they are twentythree years old and that, on any given day, one in every 100 adults is imprisoned. See Amy L. Solomon,
In Search of a Job: Criminal Records as Barriers to Employment, NAT’L INST. JUST. (2012),
http://www.nij.gov/journals/270/criminal-records.htm [https://perma.cc/V2LV-9SB7].
87
See Jessica Erickson, Comment, Racial Impact Statements: Considering the Consequences of
Racial Disproportionalities in the Criminal Justice System, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2014)
(asserting that “African Americans and Latinos account for fifty-eight percent of the United States prison
population—nearly twice their accumulated representation in the general population of thirty percent”);
see also MICHELLE A LEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 4 (2010) (“[M]ass incarceration in the United States had, in fact, emerged as a
stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control that functions in a
manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow.”); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF
JUSTICE 36–37 (2009) (examining the racially disparate effects of mass incarceration); Jonathan Simon,
A Radical Need for Criminology, 40 SOC. JUST. 9, 9 (2014) (discussing “the damage done to future
generations from incarcerating an unprecedented number of Americans, especially from communities
already disadvantaged by economic marginalization and legacies of racial discrimination”); MaryBeth
Lipp, A New Perspective on the “War on Drugs”: Comparing the Consequences of Sentencing Policies
in the United States and England, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 1022 (2004) (explaining that the AfricanAmerican population has been disproportionately harmed by the War on Drugs because “nearly one-tenth
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As a result, racial impact statement requirements were designed to force
lawmakers to consider the inequalities and complexities related to the
overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities in U.S. prisons when they
adopted or amended any legislation.88 In this way, legislators would be
pushed to consider the negative consequences that their proposed statutes
and policies might have on people of color within the criminal justice system
and in relation to the criminal justice system and, more so, would be pushed
to “consider alternative approaches that [could avoid] exacerbat[ing]
existing racial disparities.”89 The State of Minnesota’s own racial impact
statement requirement makes this purpose very clear. That statement
provides in relevant part:
[The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission] seeks to enrich the
discussion on how minorities in Minnesota are affected by changes in
sentencing policy. If a significant racial disparity can be predicted before a bill
is passed, it may be possible to consider alternatives that enhance public safety

of black males in their twenties already live in prison, and almost one out of three black males currently
remains under criminal justice control”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2004) (detailing the
pernicious effects of the War on Drugs on African-American communities); Bryan A. Stevenson,
Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases,
41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 343 (2006) (documenting that mass incarceration has disrupted the
administration of the criminal justice system); Angela Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison
Industrial Complex, COLORLINES (Sept. 10, 1998), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/masked-racismreflections-prison-industrial-complex [https://perma.cc/VF6P-WH5A] (arguing that mass incarceration,
because of its disproportionate impact on black and Latino males in the United States, has a “strategic
dependence on racist structures and ideologies”); cf. Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony
Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 351–52 (2012)
(asserting that criminal justice debt can serve as an “insurmountable obstacle” to the resumption of voting
rights and broader participation in society); Nekima Levy-Pounds, Beaten by the System and Down for
the Count: Why Poor Women of Color and Children Don’t Stand a Chance Against U.S. Drug-Sentencing
Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 462, 494 (2006) (arguing that poor women of color and their children are
adversely affected by current drug sentencing policies because such policies are designed to relegate
women of color and their children to what has been referred to as the perpetual “‘pink hole’ [that] engulfs
the most vulnerable members of society”).
88
See Erickson, supra note 87, at 1426. The American Law Institute was among the first entities to
propose the use of racial impact statements to address racial disparities in the criminal justice system. See
London, supra note 45, at 31 (referencing MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(e) (Prelim. Draft
No. 1, 2002)). In so doing, they drafted a Model Penal Code (MPC) provision that required sentencing
commissions to generate “Demographic Impact Statements” that offered predictions of what the gender,
racial, and ethnic patterns in sentencing would be under the legislation in question. MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 6A.07 (2007). The revised MPC envisions a “correctional-population forecasting model”
applicable to existing legislation as well as to newly introduced bills and amendments. Id.
89
See London, supra note 45, at 227; see also Kevin R. Reitz, Demographic Impact Statements,
O’Connor’s Warning, and the Mysteries of Prison Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda,
61 FLA. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (2009). The projections in racial impact statements are designed to engage
lawmakers in discussions concerning the potential impact of proposed legislation, thereby ensuring
legislative accountability. Id.
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without creating additional disparity in Minnesota’s criminal justice
system. . . . [T]he agency does not intend to comment on whether or not a
particular bill should be enacted. Rather, it is setting out facts that may be useful
to the Legislature, whose members frequently express concerns about the
disparity between the number of minorities in our population and the number in
our prisons.90

At the very least, racial impact statement requirements were expected
to push legislators to justify any enacted laws or policies that worked to
create, maintain, or increase racial and ethnic disparities by forcing the
legislators to explain why they had chosen to pass the statutes despite their
projected racially disparate effects. In this sense, racial impact statement
requirements have the potential to provide a means by which plaintiffs can
prove that any statute challenged in equal protection litigation was enacted
“in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon” a
racial group.91
Several states have passed legislation that requires the consideration of
racial impact statements in their legislative processes.92 Indeed, Connecticut,
Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon have each passed racial impact
legislation, and many other states, including Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Texas, and Wisconsin, have considered passing racial impact statement
legislation.93 For instance, since 2008, Iowa has mandated, through the
Minority Impact Statement Bill, that its state legislative services agency not
only prepare a correctional impact statement for proposed policy changes
related to the criminal justice system, but also conduct a racial impact
analysis that examines the impact of sentencing or parole changes on racial
and ethnic minorities.94 Iowa enacted these requirements in response to a
90
See London, supra note 45, at 228 (emphasis added) (citing MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMM’N, RACIAL IMPACT FOR H.F. 3175: ROBBERY – INCREASED PENALTIES (Feb. 29, 2008)).
91
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
92
See Erickson, supra note 87, at 1426–27; see also Nicole D. Porter, Racial Impact Statements,
SENT’G PROJECT (2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impact-statements
[https://perma.cc/SV6M-3E24] (stating that Iowa, Connecticut, Oregon, and Minnesota all adopted racial
impact statement preparation and consideration policies as of 2014, and that other states have started to
introduce racial impact statement legislation).
93
See Erickson, supra note 87, at 1426–27 (noting that Iowa, Oregon, and Connecticut have passed
racial impact statement legislation and that “[s]even other states have attempted but failed to pass” such
legislation); see also Porter, supra note 92 (stating that Minnesota adopted a racial impact statement
requirement); Corinne Ramey, State to Assess Racial Impact in Crime-Law Changes, WALL ST. J., Jan.
17, 2018, at A10B (indicating that New Jersey now requires “an analysis of [criminal justice laws’] impact
on racial and ethnic minorities, making the state among only a handful in the nation to do so”).
94
See IOWA IMPACT OF LEGISLATION AND STATE GRANTS ON MINORITIES — STATEMENTS, CH.
1095 H.F. 2393, § 2.56 (2008). In so doing, the Legislative Services Agency “may request the cooperation
of any state department or agency or political subdivision in preparing [a statement].” IOWA CODE § 2.56
(2018).
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study indicating that Iowa’s prisons had the highest racial disparities in the
nation with almost fourteen black prisoners for every one white prisoner.95
Indeed, Chet Culver, then Iowa’s governor, stated that the requirement
would allow members of the General Assembly and executive branch to
consider legislation with a “better understanding of the potential effects, both
positive and negative, on Iowa’s minority communities.”96 Since then,
Iowa’s Minority Impact Statement Bill has resulted in ten minority impact
statements; these statements have shown great promise for setting a context
in which racial disparities can be reduced in Iowa’s criminal justice system.97
For example, in one instance, Iowa lawmakers declined passing legislation
after a racial impact statement revealed that the proposed statute “would
increase penalties for cocaine offenses after a racial-impact statement
showed the policy would disproportionately affect blacks.”98
Much like Iowa, Oregon adopted a racial impact statement requirement
in 2013 because of racial disproportionality in its prison system and its child
welfare system.99 Though not as stark as the disparities in Iowa, statistics in
Oregon also exposed an overrepresentation of Blacks in its criminal justice
system, with Blacks making up only 2% of the state population but 9% of
the Oregon prison population.100 Similarly, a letter from Democratic State
Representative Joseph Gallegos, the sponsor of Oregon’s racial impact
statement bill, detailed racial disparities within Oregon’s child welfare
system, with both black and American Indian children each making up nearly
9% of the children in the child welfare system despite each comprising less
than 2% of all children in Oregon.101 Oregon’s racial impact statement
legislation requires the state sentencing commission or a legislative analyst
to produce a statistical report if one member of each party requests such a

95
See Farai Chideya, Iowa Considering Racial Impact in Sentencing Laws, NPR (May 1, 2008, 9:00
AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90102924 [https://perma.cc/3LZ4-EQZX]
(reporting that while 2% of Iowa’s population is black, 24% of the state’s prison population is black).
96
Id.
97
See Ramey, supra note 93. In 2009 alone, Iowa issued ten minority impact statements during its
state legislative session. London, supra note 45, at 229 (citing an e-mail from Beth Lenstra, Senior
Analyst, Iowa Legislative Services Agency, to the author in October 2009).
98
Ramey, supra note 93.
99
Maggie Clark, Should More States Require Racial Impact Statements for New Laws?, PEW
CHARITABLE
TR.
(July
30,
2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2013/07/30/should-more-states-require-racial-impact-statements-for-new-laws
[https://perma.cc/EE3M-9LGR].
100
Id.
101
Id.
(providing
a
link
to
the
letter,
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2013R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/22286
[https://perma.cc/P6DL-4UUA]).
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report.102 It also requires the report to “show how [the] proposed law could
have consequences for sentencing, probation or parole policies affecting
minorities disproportionately . . . .”103 Although Oregon’s bill, unlike Iowa’s,
is relatively new and has not been utilized as much, lawmakers like
Representative Gallegos believe that it will push legislators to use state
resources more efficiently and effectively.104
Because Blacks and Latinos are overrepresented in the prison
population in essentially every state in the United States, and because racial
impact statement requirements in each state would require legislators to
explicitly confront and interrogate the racial implications of professional
license-restricting statutes before they were either created or amended, racial
impact statements, which are “modeled on fiscal and environmental impact
statements,”105 have a very strong potential for helping to reduce labor market
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated across the nation. They have
the potential for doing so because they help to strip legislators of any claims
of ignorance or lack of knowledge about the potentially dangerous outcomes
of any enacted legislation on communities of color. More importantly, racial
impact statement requirements may make social science knowledge of
racially disparate effects—knowledge that the McCleskey Court found
insufficient to prove intent to discriminate—a potential consideration for
legislative bodies and, ultimately, courts in any future equal protection
litigation.
III. A CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION TO PRIVATE EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST THE FORMERLY INCARCERATED
Although racial impact statement requirements have the potential for
effectively combating the harmful effects of professional license-restricting
statutes on the formerly incarcerated, additional action is needed to address
private labor market discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. The
use of low-paid prison labor by private corporations remains a widespread
practice that calls into question the policies of those same corporations that
prohibit employing the formerly incarcerated. In this Part, the Essay traces
the rise of prison labor as a relic of slavery, and makes the argument that, to
finally jettison prison labor practices as a particular remnant of racial slavery
in the United States, prison labor cannot exist alongside private firm policies
that compound the exclusion of the formerly incarcerated from the labor
market.
102
103
104
105
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While the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has been
lauded by history books and legal scholars for abolishing slavery, the
Amendment has also been read to uphold labor practices that in reality could
amount to slavery for a certain segment of the American population—that is,
those convicted of a crime.106 The Thirteenth Amendment reads: “Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”107 Consider the case of Morales v.
Schmidt, where the Seventh Circuit noted that “[t]he Thirteenth Amendment,
if read literally, suggests that the States may treat their prisoners as
slaves . . . .”108 Indeed, this literal interpretation is evident in an earlier case,
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, where the Virginia Supreme Court observed that a
prisoner,
during his term of service in the penitentiary, [] is in a state of penal servitude
to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty,
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to
him. He is for the time being the slave of the State.109

Some legal scholars have challenged this interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment as denying any labor protection for all prisoners.110
As Raja Raghunath explained,
[r]eading the Thirteenth Amendment in a manner that is consistent with the
weight of constitutional jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment and the
Fifth Amendment reveals that only those inmates who are forced to work
because they have been so sentenced should be exempted from the general ban
on involuntary servitude.111

106

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241–42 (1911).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
108
489 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1973), on reh’g, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
109
62 Va. 790, 796 (1871) (emphasis added).
110
See, e.g., Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 869, 872 (2012) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment allows for forced inmate labor only when
the labor approximates the conditions of involuntary servitude, rather than slavery); Mary Rose
Whitehouse, Modern Prison Labor: A Reemergence of Convict Leasing Under the Guise of Rehabilitation
and Private Enterprises, 18 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 89, 106–07 (2017) (explaining four primary factors courts
use to determine the economic reality of prison labor and thus prisoners’ eligibility for labor protections:
“(1) [w]hether the alleged employer ha[s] the power to hire and fire the employees; (2) [w]hether the
alleged employer supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3)
[w]hether the alleged employer determined the rate and method of payment; and (4) [w]hether the alleged
employer maintained employment records”).
111
Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Application of the
Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 395, 398 (2009) (emphasis in original).
107
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The legal rationale behind this assertion is that constitutional protections
against unfair labor practices are “denied to prisoners compelled to work [as
part of their penal punishment] because the beneficial value of the prisoners’
labor was owned by the prison; i.e., they were enslaved by the state.”112 As
Raghunath further explicated, even if a “plain reading of the Thirteenth
Amendment would allow for the imposition of either involuntary servitude
or slavery as punishment for crime,” societal changes may indicate a
different direction; given changing attitudes towards punishment and the fact
that “we no longer view the infliction of pain—or rather, too much pain—as
an acceptable form of punishment . . . presumably sentencing convicted
criminals to slave-like conditions (or granting prison wardens the discretion
to treat them as such) is not an acceptable policy option.”113
Although there might seem to be a general consensus against the
imposition of slave-like labor conditions as a form of punishment in theory,
in practice, low-paid or unpaid prison labor has been a longstanding feature
of prison life in the United States. The extraction of the labor of prisoners in
the United States can be traced back to the first prisons built by European
colonialists in the 1600s.114 The first carceral systems in colonial America
depended on prison labor for financial support.115 The pecuniary costs of
maintaining the penal system were directly transferred to the prisoners.116
The prison administration accomplished this by renting out the labor of
prisoners to private enterprises or by compelling inmates to produce goods
for sale.117 In this way, inmates were obliged “to pay for the expenses of
staying in the prison, including all transactions between entry and
discharge.”118 While many would argue that the original goal of prison labor
in the United States was to promote an ascetic ideal of self-abnegation and

112

Id. at 399 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 405 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
114
See DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 19–26
(1995) (chronicling the development of American prison labor to sixteenth-century European
“workhouses” in which “[l]abor was a major component of the confinement”); Timothy J. Flanagan,
Prison Labor and Industry, in THE AMERICAN PRISON: ISSUES IN RESEARCH AND POLICY 135, 139
(Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds., 1989) (“[W]ork has been a feature of American
corrections here since institutions have been used as a mechanism for correcting offenders.” (emphasis
omitted)); Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 345–70 (1998)
(discussing the development of modern prison labor starting from early years of the United States).
115
Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35, 37, 50 (1921).
116
SHICHOR, supra note 114, at 29.
117
Id. at 28–30.
118
Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector Solution
to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV . 2209, 2214 (1998).
113
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discipline,119 prison labor has taken on a more profit-driven capitalist tenor
since the nineteenth century.120 In what has been described as “the golden
age” of the American penitentiary121 following the American Civil War, the
rise of public prisons run by private contractors foretold the expansion of
prison labor.122
The Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century was a major
factor123 that drove the expansion of prison labor under the “lease” system, 124
as states started to “lease” inmates to private companies as cheap labor.125
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the lease system was most prevalent in the Southern
states after the Civil War and the end of slavery.126 Pursuant to the lease
system, inmates worked for little or no pay on plantations, railroads, mines,
and other business ventures that required inexpensive, unskilled labor,127
with the goal of producing the maximum financial profit for the
entrepreneurs who leased the labor.128
Prison labor as an industry declined in the early twentieth century due
to various factors. First, it faced criticism regarding the subjection of leased
119

See SHICHOR, supra note 114, at 30 (arguing t h a t prison work in early America was
introduced primarily “for purposes of repentance and institutional discipline to control inmates”);
Edward Dauber, HARVARD CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 200, 221–22 (1972) (discussing the perception of prisoners’ rights
and the idea that judicial intervention in the prison discipline system was not thought necessary until the
early 1970s); Vernon Fox, Analysis of Prison Disciplinary Problems, 49 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, &
POL. SCI . 321, 322 (1958) (describing the primary techniques of the system of prison discipline).
120
Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 451 (2005)
(“[T]he history of nineteenth-century American prisons is a history of contracting between the
state and private interests for the use of convict labor in efforts on both sides to achieve financial
gain.”); see also PAUL W. KEVE , PRISONS AND THE A MERICAN CONSCIENCE : A H ISTORY OF
U.S. FEDERAL CORRECTIONS (1991) (providing an in-depth analysis of the aftermath of the
American Revolution and the subsequent expansion of the American penal system during the
nineteenth century).
121
See Flanagan, supra note 114, at 139–41.
122
Id.
123
See SHICHOR, supra note 114, at 26–28 (1995) (“The development of the penitentiary . . . was
integrally related to rapid industrialization . . . . Because the modern prison was developed during a period
of rapid industrial development in the Western world, it fit into the system of mass production.”).
124
Dolovich, supra note 120, at 450–51.
125
Id.
126
See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE
19TH -CENTURY A MERICAN SOUTH 185–222 (1984) (detailing the use of the lease system in
Southern states during the Reconstruction era).
127
MICK RYAN & TONY WARD, PRIVATIZATION AND THE PENAL SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE AND THE DEBATE IN BRITAIN 18 (1989) (“Plantation owners, railway companies and
mining corporations, all queued up to lease prisoners and work them more or less as
slaves . . . .”).
128
See AYERS, supra note 126, at 193 (“The lease system was tailor-made for capitalists
concerned only with making money fast.”).
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convicts to abusive conditions.129 Second, prison labor faced attacks from
labor unions because it had dampened the wages of all workers.130 Yet, prison
labor is once again flourishing today because such labor is viewed as the
solution to the problems linked to the cost of incarceration.131 One of the most
visible proponents of prison labor, Chief Justice Warren Burger argued:
Most prison inmates, by definition, are maladjusted people . . . . They do not
share the work ethic concepts that made this country great. They were not taught
at home—or in the schools—the moral values that lead people to have respect
and concern for the rights of others. Place that person in a factory, . . . pay that
person reasonable compensation, and charge something for “room and board
and keep,” and we will have a better chance to release from prison a person able
to secure gainful employment. Added to that it will be a person whose selfesteem will at least have been improved so there is a better chance that he or
she can live a normal life.132

The use of prison labor, while not universally embraced, still enjoys
considerable support today,133 particularly since it is seen as an efficient
method for inmates to learn job skills and gain some income, all while
contributing to their own upkeep.134 Approximately 50% of the inmates
housed in state or federal prisons work in some type of job assignment while

129

Dolovich, supra note 120, at 452.
See RYAN & WARD, supra note 127, at 19 (arguing “the opposition of organized labour [in the
early twentieth century] turned out to be decisive” for reducing use of prison labor in the United States);
Garvey, supra note 114, at 358–370 (identifying opposition from labor organizations as cause of decline
in prison labor during this period); see also Duitsman, supra note 118, at 2215–16 (attributing decline to
human rights critiques, pressure from labor movement, and “desire to use prisons for reformatory
purposes”).
131
See NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, BRIEF ANALYSIS NO. 245, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
PRISON LABOR 1–2 (1997), www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba245.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MRJ-F4ZQ]
(arguing increased use of prison labor could reduce taxes, help prevent recidivism, and improve the
economy); George D. Bronson et al., Barriers to Entry of Private-Sector Industry into a Prison
Environment, in PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM 325, 325–26 (Gary W. Bowman et
al. eds., 1992) (“[T]he inmates receive positive gain by . . . [use of inmate labor]. They are able to learn
work skills [and] earn additional income . . . .”); see also Kathleen E. Maguire et al., Prison Labor
and Recidivism, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3–4, 13–14 (1988) (highlighting
“economic appeal” of prison labor and its usefulness in distracting prisoners from “idleness,”
but demonstrating through quantitative methods that prison labor does not significantly
reduce instances of recidivism in convicts).
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Warren E. Burger, More Warehouses, or Factories with Fences?, 8 N.E. J. ON PRISON L.
111, 116 (1982).
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Whitehouse, supra note 108, at 89.
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George D. Bronson et al., supra note 129, at 326 (arguing that there is a rehabilitative benefit
when prisoners are compelled to work to pay for their room and board).
130

1410

112:1385 (2018)

Combating Discrimination

incarcerated.135 As noted by Noah Zatz, “prison industries generate $2 billion
in revenue annually.”136 Momentarily setting aside the legal and ethical
implications of prison labor,137 the fact that corporations successfully benefit
from the labor of imprisoned individuals raises the question of whether or
not those same corporations should then be allowed to dismiss formerly
incarcerated job applicants. For illustrative purposes, Table 1138 below lists
some prominent American-based companies with large employee bases that
use prison labor and that also generally do not hire formerly incarcerated
individuals.

135
See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 V AND . L. REV . 857, 868 n.30 (2008) (citing
employment statistics for inmates).
136
See i d . a t 868–69 (citing CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., THE 2002 CORRECTIONS
YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS 118, 124–25 (Camille Graham Camp ed., 2002)).
137
One of the authors, Ifeoma Ajunwa, discusses the ethics of prison labor practices and the corporate
social responsibility of private firms in another paper.
138
This is not at all an exhaustive list and is being offered only for illustrative purposes.
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TABLE 1: COMPANIES THAT USE PRISON LABOR AND FAIL TO EMPLOY THE
FORMERLY INCARCERATED139
Company Name

Uses Prison Labor?

Employs Formerly
Incarcerated?

McDonald’s

Yes

Franchises—some will,
others will not. No blanket
bans.

Walmart

Yes

No, in most cases. The
company reports that it
does hire felons, but has
extremely strict criminal
background checks.

Victoria’s Secret

Yes

Depends on the conviction.

AT&T

Yes

Requires that your
conviction is at least 7
years old. Still are not
considered a “felon
friendly” employer.

Wendy’s

Yes

Franchises—some will,
others will not.

K-Mart

Yes

Depends on the conviction.

John Deere

Yes

No, in most cases.

Bank of America

Yes

No, in most cases.

State Farm

Yes

No, in most cases.

If prison labor is deemed an appropriate vehicle to enable prisoners to
gain job skills, why then should companies, who ostensibly have benefited
from those same job skills while a formerly incarcerated individual was
behind bars, also have the power to reject the same individual when she
presents herself in the private labor market? If prison labor is to serve any
form of rehabilitative goal, then it stands to reason that formerly incarcerated
individuals who have taken it upon themselves (or been compelled) to gain
skills valuable in the labor market should have the equal opportunity to
exercise those skills.
139
Most of the data we could find on employment of the formerly incarcerated came from online
search forums because policies against hiring the formerly incarcerated are not always publicized on
company websites. The data for the companies listed can be found either at
https://helpforfelons.org/companies-that-hire-felons
[https://perma.cc/HN7V-A26T]
or
http://www.jobsforfelonshub.com/jobs-for-felons [https://perma.cc/RU32-NUAU].
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In fact, one potential solution to private labor market discrimination
against the formerly incarcerated might be recognizing the low-paid work
that many of the incarcerated do on behalf of corporations. The state penal
institutions that lease prisoners to such corporations could push for a
contractual agreement which stipulates that corporations will abrogate
policies that bar the formerly incarcerated from employment and that seek to
inquire about criminal records, as those policies could have a chilling effect
on formerly incarcerated job applicants.
This genre of contractual obligations finds legal precedent in the
obligations that the government enforces on its private contractors, who must
abide by higher standards of workplace diversity and ethics.140 When it
comes to removing the barriers to employment for the formerly incarcerated,
some focus must be on dissuading private firms from discriminating against
the formerly incarcerated. Note, for example, that the EEOC advised in a
recent policy statement that using criminal background checks for
employment purposes would violate the law if the checks are used to
intentionally discriminate against minorities or if they have a demonstrably
adverse discriminatory impact on minorities.141 Consequently, employers are
advised against using blanket criminal record checks in their hiring
decisions; the checks should instead relate to “business necessity.”142 This
focus on preventing private firms from discriminating against the formerly
incarcerated has led to “Ban the Box” (BTB) movements in several states
and cities, and as a result of such efforts, many cities have adopted policies
that make it illegal for employers to include questions soliciting information
about an applicant’s criminal record at the initial application stage.143

140
Employers are required to meet certain affirmative action obligations if they do business with the
federal government and are covered by the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 503, the Vietnam Era
Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Executive Order 11246, or the Jobs for Veterans Act.
The threshold amounts for these laws typically begin at the $10,000-contract level, and compliance
requirements increase as the amount of the contract and the size of the contractor’s workforce increase.
An affirmative action program is a management tool designed to ensure equal opportunity in recruiting,
hiring, training, promoting, and compensating individuals. Affirmative action goes beyond equal
employment opportunity measures, requiring employers to eliminate discriminatory conditions, whether
inadvertent or intentional, and to treat all employees equally in the workplace. See Government
Contractors:
What
You
Need
to
Know,
BLR
https://www.blr.com/HREmployment/Discrimination/Government-Contractors [https://perma.cc/9SKJ-FF3W].
141
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
142
Id.
143
See BAN THE BOX CAMPAIGN, http://bantheboxcampaign.org [https://perma.cc/C5TB-RRR3];
Pamela Q. Devata et al., Trends in the “Ban the Box” Movement: Recent Developments in City
Ordinances,
LABOR
AND
EMP’T
LAW
COUNSEL
(2016)
https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2016/05/trends-in-the-ban-the-box-movementrecent-developments-in-city-ordinances [https://perma.cc/A2G8-ME2V] (indicating that twenty-six
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However, the efficacy of BTB policies is yet unproven, and some
preliminary studies may even indicate that they have undesirable effects.144
For example, a Yale Law School study on the BTB movement and its effects
on employment discrimination found that employers who ask about criminal
records are 63% more likely to call back an applicant if he has no criminal
record.145 Additionally, the study showed that BTB policies—where
employers refrain from asking about criminal records at least until a
conditional offer of employment is made—encouraged statistical
discrimination on the basis of race.146 Specifically, the study showed that,
before BTB, white job applicants to employers who asked about criminal
records “received 7% more callbacks than similar black applicants, but after
BTB [that] gap grew to 45%.”147 These potential effects of the BTB policy
point to another contractual solution for remedying private firm
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated. Contracts between state or
federal prisons and private corporations could mirror the diversity initiative
imposed on federal contractors. In this way, private firms that make use of
prison labor could be contractually required to employ at least some
percentage of formerly incarcerated individuals.148
As discussed above, employment is crucial to reentry, regardless of
whether or not the formerly incarcerated are seen as a special class. Thus, we
must still consider carefully whether excluding the formerly incarcerated
from gainful employment—without any scientific evidence supporting the
benefits of such exclusions—serves the larger societal goal of reintegration
after incarceration.

cities and counties have adopted some form of BTB legislation as of 2016, including New York City,
Philadelphia, San Francisco and Austin, Texas).
144
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled
Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are Hidden,
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (July 2016) http://www.nber.org/papers/w22469#fromrss
[https://perma.cc/HH6Y-BK9R]; Christina Stacy & Mychal Cohen, Ban the Box and Racial
Discrimination,
URBAN
INST.
(Feb.
2017)
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88366/ban_the_box_and_racial_discrimination.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Q3L-VYUZ].
145
Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A
Field Experiment 4 (2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/workshop/leo/leo16_starr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SPN4-D74C].
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
See supra note 140.
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CONCLUSION
In Greek Mythology, Prometheus disobeys Zeus and steals fire for
humans.149 As punishment, Prometheus is chained to a rock in the Caucasus
Mountains where, eternally, his liver is eaten daily by an eagle only to
regenerate and be eaten again.150 To our modern sensibilities, this type of
perpetual punishment (in fiction) is exceedingly harsh. Yet, in the real world,
our society has routinely condoned the collateral consequences of
conviction, including labor market discrimination against the formerly
incarcerated, which effectively punish, in perpetuity, the formerly
incarcerated for the crimes that they have already paid a debt for. In so doing,
our society has only undermined efforts to reintegrate the formerly
incarcerated. Furthermore, given the significant numbers of racial minorities
who have been incarcerated (some wrongfully), continued punishment in the
form of collateral consequences seems not only particularly punitive, but
also racially discriminatory. Indeed, the rejection of the formerly
incarcerated by corporations that rely on prison labor appears hypocritical
and without rational basis. Most of all, we should question whether a lack of
equal opportunity for the formerly incarcerated on the labor market means
their permanent designation as an economic underclass and whether this
ultimately betrays the principles of fairness and equality foundational to
American democracy.
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J.M. Hunt, The Creation of Man by Prometheus, HELLENIC SOC’Y PROMETHEAS, INC.,
http://www.prometheas.org/mythology.html [https://perma.cc/HF62-97UE].
150
Aetos Kaukasios, THEOI PROJECT (2000), http://www.theoi.com/Ther/AetosKaukasios.html
[https://perma.cc/54FB-LWSL].
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